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VII. EVIDENCE
A. Scientific DNA Evidence
The 1994 holding in State v. Bloom' is of dual importance
to the Minnesota trial lawyer. The court held that in criminal
prosecutions for rape, a mathematically-created DNA percentage
number may be used for the purpose of identity.2 In doing so,
the court also shed light on the standard a trial judge should use
when deciding whether to allow testimony regarding scientific
evidence into a case.
The defendant, Troy Bradley Bloom, was accused of raping
J.L.P. shortly after 1:00 a.m. while she entered her Brooklyn Park
home.' The facts of the rape were not crucial to the issues,4
but of importance was the fact that the victim did not see her
assailant5 and the defendant left several sperm samples.6 These
samples eventually were used to create a DNA match.7 The
language to explain this match is what is at issue. Often a
number can be created that purports to explain the significance
1. 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994). The Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated
three lower court cases: State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994); State v. Perez,
516 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1994); State v. Bauer, 516 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 1994). Bloom,
516 N.W.2d at 160 n.1.
2. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d at 160.
3. Id.
4. This is evident by the facts of the rape being detailed in a footnote. Id. at 160
n.2. Apparently, the defendant approachedJ.L.P. from behind and placed a stocking
cap over her head. He then put the victim in her car's backseat and drove around
making demands for sex. Threatening her with a screwdriver, the defendant forced
J.LP. to submit to fellatio, digital penetration, and ordinary sexual penetration. Id.
5. Because J.L.P. did not see her assailant, the DNA percentage was a key
component for identification of the defendant. Id.
6. After the assault, sperm was taken from the victim and the back car seat. These
samples were used to link the defendant to the crime scene. Id.
7. James Liberty, who does forensic work and was trained by the F.B.I., testified
that he used information from two of the six DNA probes to make a computer search
of possible matches. The defendant's name came up with four other possible matches.
Noting that the defendant "stood out," Liberty proceeded to compare the loci in the
database to the defendant's loci. The end determination was that there was a match.
Liberty then compared blood taken from the defendant after the arrest, as well as
semen from the victim's boyfriend, to exclude the latter and solidify the former. After
some calculations, Liberty concluded that there was a one in 93,700 chance that a
randomly-selected person would match all five loci points. Id.
1
Terry: A Survey of Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
WILLIAM MITC-IELL LAW REVIEW
of the match. In this case, two numbers were created.' The
court focused on the percentage of one in 634,687. This
represents the assumption that there is a one in 634,687 chance
that the DNA of a randomly-selected person would match the
DNA make-up contained in the sperm samples.'
After a discussion of what makes DNA unique,"° the majority
focused its attention on the many errors that can occur when
using the number in rape prosecutions. Errors may occur either
by the scientists who analyze the DNA" or by jurors who
misunderstand what the number truly represents." Some of the
more important realizations were discussed when looking at what
an average juror would think when he or she hears the num-
ber. 2
Prior court holdings show the overwhelming fear is that a
juror will place too much emphasis on the number. All prior
DNA number holdings have shown this fear and the outcome
8. The first number explaining the match was one in 93,700. See supra note 7.
Later, Professor Daniel Hart, a biology professor at Harvard, concluded that a few
minor adjustments to Mr. Liberty's calculation created the true number of a one in
634,687 chance of a random person having the same loci match. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d
at 160 n.2. This statistic is created by using the product or multiplication rule to
combine individual frequencies by multiplying them against each other and by the
number two. Id. at 161 (citing William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New
Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the 'DNA War, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22,
69 n.208 (1993)).
9. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d at 161.
10. Id. DNA is a double-stranded molecule found in chromosomes. These
molecules are found in all cells that have a nucleus, including white blood cells, hair
root cells, sperm cells, and saliva cells. If the DNA match, they may have a common
source. Scientists have not yet discovered a DNA profile that cannot be shared by
multiple parties. With this in mind, the DNA statistic is based upon the assumption that
"as the number and variability of the polymorphisms utilized in the typing procedure
increases, the odds of two people having the same profile become vanishingly small."
Id. (citing David T. Wasserman, The Mortality of Statistical Proof and the Risk of Mistaken
Liability, 13 CARDOzO L. REv. 935, 972 (1991)).
11. A non-exhaustive list of possible errors includes: (1) the database that the
scientist used may underestimate the frequency in the population of a particular DNA
pattern; (2) the database may under represent by not taking into account variations
among population subgroups; (3) the statistical independence may be invalid because
people often mate with similar people and therefore assuming that traits such as blond
hair and blue eyes are separate may be misleading because many blond haired people
have blue eyes; (4) the laboratory may provide a false positive match because of sloppy
work; (5) human error or simple miscalculation and the fact that if there is an error in
even one band being matched, the jury will hear a number that suggests a strong match
when in reality there is none. Id. at 161-62.
12. Id. at 162.
[Vol. 22
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was tailored to prevent it. 3 In Bloom, the court methodically
explained the numerous errors a juror could make.
When a juror hears the testimony that there is a one in
634,687 chance that a randomly-selected person, if tested, would
have the same DNA profile of that left at the scene, the juror
must first assume that there is a true match. Often jurors never
imagine that there may be a false positive match, meaning the
test says one thing, but the reality is the opposite. 4 The juror
then must make the jump that a true match means the defen-
dant is the source. 5 "The probability that a randomly selected
person would have the same profile as the sample found at the
scene is not the probability that someone other than the
defendant is the source."16 If the defendant is the source of
the DNA, then the juror must assume that the defendant was at
the scene.1 7 The last inference the juror must make is often
13. Three cases document the history of the DNA number in Minnesota courts.
See State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1987); State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480 (Minn.
1983); State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978). The court's caution is evidenced
by these holdings.
In Kim, the court did not allow the statistic that 96.4% of all males, but not the
defendant, could be excluded on the basis of blood combinations found on bed sheets.
Citing Boyd, the court again stated its fear that the number may represent guilt to the
jury. Kim 398 N.W.2d at 548-49 (citing Boyd, 331 N.W.2d at 482).
In Boyd, the statistics used were that there was a 99.911% chance that the defendant
was the father of the child and that there was a one in 1,121 chance that a randomly-
selected man would have all of the appropriate genes to have fathered the child. The
court did not allow either statistic, but permitted the expert to testify that none of the
fifteen tests excluded the defendant as the father. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d at 481-83.
In Carlson, the court disallowed the statistic that there was a one in 4,500 chance
that foreign hairs were not the defendant's. "Testimony expressing opinions . .. in
terms of statistical probabilities can make the uncertain seem all but proven, and
suggest, by quantification, satisfaction of the requirement that guilt be established
'beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Carlson, 267 N.W.2d at 176. Instead the court allowed
testimony that microscopic comparisons on the hair showed similarities between the
hair at the scene and the defendant's hair. Id.
14. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d at 162. "Jurors hear impressive numbers that appear to
quantify with precision the frequency of the DNA profile, accompanied (when the issue
is raised at all) by a vague non-quantitative discussion of the chances of a false positive."
Id. (citing Thompson, supra note 8, at 91-92).
15. Id. The court stated that there is nothing wrong with this jump, but the juror
must understand that he or she is making the jump. Id.
16. Id. (citingJonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA
Evidene at Tria, 34JURIMETRICSJ. 21, 27 (1993)).
17. Id. at 163. Again, there is nothing wrong with this assumption as long as the
juror understands that there are other ways the defendant could have left a sample
without having been at the scene of the crime. Id.
1996]
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coined the "prosecutor's fallacy" or "ultimate issue error.""8 If
the defendant was at the scene, the defendant must have
committed the crime. This of course may not be true because
the defendant may have left the scene before the crime was
committed or the defendant may have been framed. 9
Notwithstanding the acknowledgment of forcing jurors into
performing mental gymnastics and the numerous areas for error,
the court held that a properly-stated statistic may be admissi-
ble.21 Where once an expert could only state that the defen-
dant and the DNA were "consistent, "21 now "any properly
qualified prosecution or defense expert may, if evidentiary
foundation is sufficient, give an opinion as to random match
probabilities using the NRC's [National Research Council]
approach to computing that statistic." 22 This allows more than
the "consistent" term and in fact the expert may state that there
is a "match" between the DNA left at the scene and the defen-
dant.23 The strength of the expert's opinion will vary depend-
ing on the expert's confidence and foundation for the opin-
ion.24
The court continued to limit certain testimony. An expert
may not state that the defendant's DNA is unique or that the
"defendant is the source to the exclusion of all others."25 The
expert may not give an opinion about the strength of the
evidence, but may state that "to a reasonable scientific certainty,
the defendant is (or is not) the source."26
Although the Bloom holding is expressly focused upon
allowing the statistical percentage number in rape cases,
considerable knowledge can be gleaned from the inference
underlying the holding. The majority states that "any properly
qualified prosecution or defense expert may, if evidentiary
foundation is sufficient, give an opinion as to random match
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 167.
21. Id.; see State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544,548-49 (1987) (explaining the court's fears
of the jury over emphasizing the number and therefore only allowing the more tepid
conclusion of consistency).
22. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d at 167.
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probability using the NRC's approach to computing the statis-
tic. " 27 An issue that recently was addressed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court is often raised as to what makes an expert qualified
and what foundation is necessary to allow testimony regarding
scientific evidence.28 Bloom's hidden message may be Minne-
sota's new approach to analyzing this issue.
Since 1923, when an issue arose regarding whether to allow
expert testimony about scientific matters, the federal courts have
been guided by the holding in Frye v. United States.29  The Frye
court held that if testimony was offered and it was based upon
science that has a "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific
community, the court should allow it." Because it was a federal
holding, state courts did not have to accept it. Minnesota
eventually accepted Frye, but with a twist.
Minnesota common law crafted a two-prong test to deter-
mine whether expert testimony concerning scientific matters is
allowed. 1 The first prong focuses on Frye's concerns of commu-
nity acceptance. The second prong asks for additional proof of
reliability. 2 Until 1993, the federal law was clear. In that year,
27. Id. at 167.
28. SeeDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993).
In Dauber, the Court held that the touchstone test for allowing scientific evidence
testimony was whether the testimony adhered to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. This
meant the testimony must be based on "scientific knowledge," i.e., it is reliable, and the
testimony must be relevant, i.e., helpful, to the trier of fact. Id. at 2795. This was a
drastic change from the prior holding in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C.
1923), that expert testimony would be allowed if the testimony relied on science that
was "generally accepted" in the relevant scientific community.
The new rule laid out several factors to help determine reliability. (1) has the
scientific conclusion been tested; (2) has there been peer review; (3) what is the known
or potential rate of error; and (4) has there been a general acceptance of the science
in the community. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97. To determine relevance, the question
is simply whether the offered testimony will help the trier of facts determine questions
of fact. Id. at 2796.
29. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (App. D.C. 1923).
30. See supra note 28 (explaining the holding of Frye).
31. For an excellent overview of Minnesota's approach, see Wilbur W. Fluegel, Will
Daubert Alter Minnesota Practice? The Review of Novel Scientific Evidence in State Court will
not Likely Change, MINNESOTA TRIAL LAWYERS MAGAZINE, Winter 1995, at 12.
32. See State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); State v. Kolander, 236 Minn.
209, 221-22, 52 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1952).
In Mack, the defendant was charged with assault and aggravated sexual conduct.
Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 765. The issue was whether the victim's hypnosis-induced
testimony was admissible to help convict the defendant. The court held it was not
admissible due to the scientific community's lack of consensus as to whether it was
reliable. Id. at 768.
19961
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the U.S. Supreme Court issued its holding in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.a3 Instead of focusing exclusively on
the community's acceptance of the scientific testimony, as it did
in Frye, the Court shifted the focus to whether the evidence was
reliable and relevant.3 4  Minnesota's response to this new
direction has been slow and tepid.
There has been no Minnesota Supreme Court holding to
guide the lower courts when determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Thus, the lower courts are at a loss as to
which standard to apply. The best example of this confusion is
demonstrated in State v. Grayson.5 In Grayson, District Court
Judge Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick decided the admittance of a DNA
Polymerase Chain Reaction test by analyzing both the two-prong
test and the new Daubert standard."6 Conveniently, under both
tests the expert witness testimony was admitted. 7 However, the
opinion leaves the impression that Judge Fitzpatrick was not
certain as to which test to use. To cover all the bases, he simply
analyzed both the old Minnesota standard and the new federal
In Kolander, the defendant was tried for arson. On direct examination, the
prosecution asked a witness whether the defendant had submitted to a lie detector test.
Kolander, 236 Minn. at 219, 52 N.W.2d at 464. In determining whether lie detector test
testimony was allowed, the court focused on Fiyels community acceptance standard. Id.
In addition, the court discussed the unreliability associated with result interpretation
and operator sureness. This is considered the second prong analysis. Fluegel, supra
note 31, at 13.
33. 118 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
34. See supra note 28 (explaining the holding and factors of Daubert).
35. No. K2-94-1298, 1994 WL 670312 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Nov. 8, 1994). The facts of
the case are not detailed in the opinion. Apparently, a rape was committed. This can
be inferred from the type of tests performed on underwear, pubic hair and a bloody
hand print. Id. at *1.
36. Id. at *4. The issue in Grayson was whether a second type of DNA test, called
Polymerase-Chain-Reaction (PCR), that linked the defendant to the crime was as
reliable and/or accepted in the community. Id. at *2. The issue arose when the
defendant attempted to suppress all DNA evidence derived from the PCR tests. Judge
Fitzpatrick noted that there are two ways to test DNA. The first way, Restriction
Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) process, has already been deemed reliable and
is generally accepted in the scientific community under a holding in State v. Schwartz,
447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989). To determine the acceptance of the PCR test into
evidence, the court first used the two-prong test. Having found the test accepted and
reliable under Minnesota common law, the judge went through the factors announced
in the Daubert decision. Grayson, 1994 WL 670312, at *4; see supra note 28 for an
explanation of these factors.
37. There has never been a holding that under the Frye test, the expert may testify,
yet under the new Daubert test, the expert may not. This set of facts would help force
the supreme court to clarify which rule to apply.
[Vol. 22
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Notwithstanding the lack of a clear holding as to which
standard to use, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has continued
to apply the two-prong test and has expressly left the decision to
follow Daubert up to the Minnesota Supreme Court."9 As of this
writing, the supreme court has declined all offers to clarify the
situation.'°
Although the court has not expressly stated which direction
it will head, Bloom may be read to imply the court's direction.
Although neither Frye nor Daubert were cited in the case, the
holding focuses on the admissibility of expert testimony regard-
ing statistical evidence linking the defendant to rape. This issue
seems ripe for a Daubert.type analysis. Instead, the court focused
on the reliability of the DNA testing, the method by which the
number was chosen, the many errors that may occur with the
scientists and the jury, and how in the future these errors may be
limited by precise statements. The flavor of the opinion is of the
court attempting to justify the statistics with facts showing
reliability." If the notion of reliability is paramount, the
principles of Daubert are followed.
Although the express holding now allows the admittance of
the number when prosecuting a rape case, the inferred guidance
directing the lower courts to focus on reliability may be the more
important long-term holding.
38. Grayson, 1994 WL 670312, at *3-4.
39. See State v. Bauer, 512 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). In Bauer, the
defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his step daughter. Id. DNA evidence was
admitted and used to help convict him. Id. at 116. The defendant requested a Frye
hearing to determine whether the laboratory complied with the standards set out in the
community. Id. at 114. In a footnote, the court of appeals acknowledged Daubert, but
decided to allow the Minnesota Supreme Court to clarify which law to apply. By doing
so, the court continued to adhere to the Frye standards. Id. at 115 n.1.
40. See Fairview Hosp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 535 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1995).
In Fairview Hospita the court stated in a foomote that a Daubert-type analysis would not
be necessary to determine if a data model should have been admitted into evidence.
Id. at 340 n.4. Because the court cited Dauber, it may be inferred that this is the
standard it had applied.
41. See State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Minn. 1994). "The techniques for the
formulation of DNA evidence, including the underlying statistics as to the probability
of a match, have been refined extensively over the last decade, and are now quite
reliable." Id. (Gardebring, J., concurring). "The parties instead focussed on the
reliability of DNA evidence." Id. at 171 (Page, J., concurring).
19961
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B. Competency Hearings for Minors
In State v. Scott,42 the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed
a set of common facts.4' The court clarified the scope of ques-
tions ajudge may ask a minor in competency hearings and what
type of evidence is necessary to restrict a defendant's right to
confront witnesses used to convict him."
The defendant, Richard Scott, was convicted of sexual
misconduct involving two children.' A competency hearing
was held to determine if the children should be allowed to testify
at trial. The trial judge determined one child was incompetent,
thus allowing the child's testimony to be recorded outside of the
defendant's presence.' The audio-taped interview was allowed
into evidence under Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivi-
sion 3.47 The defendant appealed his conviction and argued
that he should have been able to confront all witnesses used
against him at trial.
When deciding if a child is competent to testify, the trial
judge has a very limited and precise role. The role is to decide
whether the child understands and has the ability to differentiate
between the truth and a lie.' Questions that provide informa-
tion about the child's background are also appropriate.49 The
line is crossed, however, when a judge begins to ask questions
about the specifics of anticipated testimony.5 ° In the instant
42. 501 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1993).
43. Children being abused and forced to testify is a common theme. The
commonality is shown by the Minnesota Legislature creating a hearsay exception for
sexually-abused children under Minnesota Statutes § 595.02, subdivision 3.
44. See Scott, 501 N.W.2d at 608.
45. Id. at 610. One child, H.S., was the defendant's daughter and the other, A.B.,
attended the defendant's wife's day-care service. The defendant was eventually found
guilty of eight charges of sexual misconduct. Id.
46. Id. The defendant's daughter was deemed not competent to testify, but the
other child was competent. Id.
47. Id. at 612; see also MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1994).
48. Scott, 501 N.W.2d at 613.
49. See id. In the instant case, the trial judge asked the defendant's daughter where
she went to school, what she was studying, and what activities she enjoyed during the
summer. Id.
50. Id. at 615. The trial court asked the following questions: (1) "Did you talk to
[the social services worker] about some touching your dad did?"; (2) "Can you
remember anything about [the touching]?"; and (3) "Do you remember anything about
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case, the trial judge misunderstood a previous supreme court
holding and asked questions specifically about the incident, thus
assuming the sexual assault had occurred.51
Under Scott, the court made it clear that when determining
a child's competency, the only issue to be decided by a trial
judge is whether the child understands the difference between
the truth and a lie. It is the jury's domain to decide if the
testimony is consistent and credible, not the trial judge's."
The second issue clarified under Scott is when hearsay
statements must be excluded at trial because of the defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation.53 In the instant case, after
the defendant's sexual activities became known, a sheriffs
deputy and a Department of Human Services employee arranged
and conducted a taped interview of the defendant's daughter. 4
The interview examined the subject matter of the allegations.
Based upon this interview, the defendant was arrested.
55
Because the child was deemed incompetent to testify, 6 the
audio-taped interview was admitted as substantive evidence
51. Id. at 615. In a prior case, State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1990), the
court held that a "trial court must determine whether the child understands the nature
and obligations of an oath and whether the child has 'the capacity to remember or
relate truthfully facts respecting which the child is examined.'" Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at
659 (citing MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 2(l) (1988)).
The Scott trial court interpreted the last portion of the sentence to mean a judge
should ask questions directly pertaining to the incident to verify whether the child could
remember the facts of the incident. Scott, 501 N.W.2d at 613. This is clear by the trial
court's holding that the child was incompetent because she had an "across the board
memory loss as it relates to anything to do with alleged touching by the defendant...."
Id. at 614.
The majority opinion noted that by asking questions pertaining to the incident,
"the judge has assumed that a touching occurred, precisely the issue to be decided at
the trial." Id. at 615.
52. "It is the jury's province to sort out the inconsistencies and determine
credibility, the court's province to determine competency." Scott, 501 N.W.2d at 613
(quoting Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at 660).
53. Id. at 616.
54. Id. at 610. The defendant's actions became known when A.B. was picked up
from day care and told her mom what the defendant did to her. A.B. said the touching
also was done to the defendant's daughter. A.B.'s parents called the school counselor,
who later contacted the Department of Human Services. This department called the
sheriff's office, which eventually conducted a videotaped interview of A.B. and an audio-
taped interview of the defendant's daughter. Id.
55. Id. at 612.
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pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 3.57
The defendant argued that this interview violated his Sixth
Amendment rights because he could not cross-examine the
witness.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides
as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the ight... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.""8
Inherent in this right is the fact that hearsay evidence must be
excluded unless specifically proscribed under a "firmly rooted
hearsay exception."5 9 If the evidence does not fit into one of
these hearsay exceptions, then under the Confrontation Clause
it is deemed "presumptively unreliable and inadmissible."'
In addition to the firmly-rooted hearsay exception, the U.S.
Supreme Court has carved out another exception to the
defendant's right to confrontation. As explained by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court, "if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear
from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-
examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule
does not bar the admission of the statement at trial.""'
Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 3 allows
testimony under the second exception carved out by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The statute deems a child's testimony regarding
sexual abuse as clearly truthful if several factors are met to
ensure reliability.62 The factors include, but are not limited to:
(1) whether the statements were spontaneous; (2) whether the
person talking with the child had a preconceived idea of what
the child should say; (3) whether the statements were in
57. See supra note 43 (citing the relevant part of the statute).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
59. Scott, 501 N.W.2d at 616. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that if the Sixth
Amendment was read literally, it would bar all hearsay testimony. This has been
rejected as "unintended and too extreme," thereby allowing hearsay evidence under
firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990) (citing
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987)).
Minnesota has allowed hearsay evidence under this firmly rooted hearsay exception.
See State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911 (Minn. 1992) (allowing hearsay statements of a
mother's 911 call and a child's statements to a police officer under Minnesota Rules of
Evidence 803(24) and 803(2), the residual exception and the excited utterance
exception).
60. Scott, 501 N.W.2d at 616 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 817).
61. Id. at 617 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, explaining that testimony is often
shown to be unreliable under cross-examination).
62. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1994).
[Vol. 22
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response to leading questions; (4) whether the child had a
motive to fabricate; (5) whether the statements were of the type
a child would be expected to fabricate; and (6) whether the
statements were consistent.
63
In the instant case, the court held that the audio-taped
testimony of the defendant's daughter was not reliable enough
to justify the abridgment of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights." His daughter's first admission of the incident occurred
after being asked, and therefore it was not spontaneous.65 The
responses kept changing and the deputy's questions were leading
in nature. Although there was no motive to fabricate, the court
held that this alone does not ensure reliability.6  Lastly, the
deputy's leading questions may show that he had a preconceived
notion of what the defendant's daughter should say.67
Because the audio-taped interview did not fall into a firmly-
rooted hearsay exception and the court felt the testimony was
not clearly truthful, the trial court's admission of the interview as
substantive evidence was overruled.
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Arguments
The latest case involving how far a prosecutor may go to
convict is a clear example of what not to do. The Minnesota
Supreme Court's holding in State v. Portef' clearly sets limits on
a prosecutor's strategy to convict.
The defendant, a priest named James Robert Porter, became
a nationally-known pedophile when his actions were announced
on national television's "Prime Time Live."69 A.M.D. claimed
Porter sexually assaulted her when she baby-sat Porter's children
63. Scott 501 N.W.2d at 617 (citing State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn.
1990)).
64. Id. at 619. The court compared the Scott facts to Lanam In Lanam, a day-care
provider overheard the child telling another child about the sexual contact. This was
viewed as a spontaneous admission. In addition, when questioned, the child consis-
tently said David did it. Because the child knew only one David, this was seen as a
consistent statement. Lanham, 459 N.W.2d at 657. The court also found no ill motive
to implicate David and that all questions asked of the child where not leading. Id. at
661.
65. Scott, 501 N.W.2d at 618.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 619.
68. 526 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 1995).
69. Id. at 361.
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during the early 1980s.7" This prompted A.M.D.'s sister, S.M.D.,
to allege that Porter also sexually assaulted her. The Minnesota
Supreme Court reviewed Porter's prosecution.
S.M.D. claimed Porter assaulted her in May 1987.71 In
August 1992, S.M.D. filed a report with the police accusing
Porter of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct.72 Porter was
arraigned and a change of venue was eventually granted due to
extensive negative pre-trial publicity. The publicity included the
"Prime Time Live" interview, articles in People and Time, at least
nine articles in the Minneapolis Star Tribune and at least thirteen
articles in the St. Paul Pioneer Press.
7s
At trial, the defense argued S.M.D. lacked credibility because
she was only five years old when the acts supposedly took place,
the allegations had never been told to anyone, there were many
inconsistencies, and the allegations only arose after S.M.D. heard
the accusations on television from her sister.74 Although Porter
exercised his right not to testify, his wife, Verlyne, testified and
contradicted S.M.D. on a number of points. They included the
following: (1) S.M.D. never baby-sat for them in the summer of
1987; (2) when she did baby-sit, S.M.D. always, except once, was
accompanied by her younger sister; and (3) she could not
remember a time that her husband stayed home alone with the
baby-sitter.75
To battle these inconsistencies, the prosecutor made several
statements during the closing argument in an attempt to seal the
conviction. These statements included the following: "[If you
convict,] no salve.., can [be] put on your conscience," "Do you
believe [Verlyne Porter] . . . [I]f you do and this is over, I got
time share in Santa Claus's condo at the north pole, and I will
sell you some," "I[Y] ou are not that big of suckers, and you know
70. Id.
71. Id. at 361 n.1.
72. Id. at 361. S.M.D. claimed Porter ran his hands through her hair, touched her
breasts, vaginal area, and inner thighs through her clothing while stating how beautiful
she was. During one assault, Porter allegedly bared his buttocks and pushed against
S.M.D. with an erection. Id.
Although the assaults occurred in 1987, the first anyone heard of the contact was
in 1992 when S.M.D. told her boyfriend and sister. Eventually the sister, A.M.D. went
on "Prime Time Live," which made Porter a household name. Id.
73. Id. at 362 n.4.
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that," "[Our witness testified] without impeachment by any cross-
examination."76 The prosecutor also made mention of the
"James Porter School of Sex Education" at least seven times."
The jury convicted the defendant on a total of six counts of
criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree.78
The defendant appealed his conviction on the basis that the
prosecution's closing argument inflamed the passions and
prejudices of the jury, made reference to evidence not admitted
into trial, improperly gave witnesses personal endorsements, and
made comments about the defendant's failure to call witnesses
or to contradict testimony.79 The Minnesota Supreme Court
held the defendant was denied a fair trial and remanded the
case for retrial.8"
In making this holding, several well established laws were
mentioned.8' A prosecutor may not seek a conviction at any
price." The prosecutor is a "minister of justice whose obliga-
tion is to 'guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce
the rights of the public.'"83 As part of this duty, "a prosecutor
must avoid inflaming the jury's prejudices against the defen-
dant."84
76. Id. at 363-64.
77. Id. at 363.
78. Three counts were under Minnesota Statutes § 609.345, subdivision 1 (b), which
makes it a crime to have sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen. The
other three counts were under Minnesota Statute § 609.345, subdivision 1 (c), which
makes it a crime to use force or coercion to accomplish sexual contact. Id. at 360.
79. See id. at 363-65.
80. Id. at 366.
81. Id. at 363-65. The ABA Standards dealing with appropriate closing arguments
to the jury are discussed with approval in State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815 (Minn.
1993). In short, the standards include provisions that attorneys:
1) cannot misstate evidence during closing arguments;
2) cannot express personal opinions as to testimony or guilt of the accused;
3) cannot use arguments to inflame the jury;
4) should not make arguments that divert the jury from its duty to decide the case
on the evidence by injecting broader issues than guilt or innocence of the accused
under state law.
Salitros, 499 N.W.2d at 817.
82. Porter, 526 N.W.2d at 632-33 (citing Salitros, 499 N.W.2d at 817). In Salitros, the
prosecution made statements implying the defense was making some "sort of syndrome
of standard arguments that one finds defense counsel making in 'cases of this sort.'"
The court held that this is prohibited, although the prosecution is free to anticipate
arguments that defense counsel will make. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d at 818.
83. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d at 817.
84. Porter, 526 N.W.2d at 363 (citing State v. Morgan, 235 Minn. 388, 391, 51
N.W.2d 61, 63 (1952)).
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In Porter, the court viewed the prosecutor's statements as
crossing the line. What makes this area difficult is each case is
fact specific. There is no bright line attorneys can look to when
crafting their arguments. Attorneys must look at all the cases to
learn what is not acceptable and then infer how their statements
would compare."5 Practitioners can view this case and learn that
statements that imply the jury would be "suckers" if they do not
convict are not appropriate. Furthermore, prosecutors should
not make sarcastic comments such as analogizing non-convictions
with buying time shares in Santa's condo.
The court also focused on statements made by the prosecu-
tion that referred to evidence not admitted in trial. The 'James
Porter School of Sex Education" was allowed "even though there
was no evidence of any such school admitted . ".8..6 This rule
seems clearer. Arguments to the jury must be based on evidence
produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that
evidence. 7 Because the existence of a school was never admit-
ted into evidence, the prosecutor should not have made
reference to it.
88
Attorneys also must not give personal endorsements
regarding witness credibility. 9 In this case, the prosecutor
85. In 1993, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged this limitation by stating
as follows:
The standards, of course, are not a complete and detailed guide as
to what is appropriate and inappropriate. Rather, they provide a
general outline of what is appropriate and inappropriate. As the
issue of misconduct in closing arguments is so frequently litigated,
our cases should be looked to for a more detailed explication of what
is appropriate and what is inappropriate.
Salitros, 499 N.W.2d at 818.
86. Porter, 526 N.W.2d at 363.
87. Id. (citing State v. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 511, 57 N.W.2d 419, 422
(1953)).
88. The State argued that the prosecutor was simply being colorful. The defense
argued that the school reference was used to remind the jurors of the allegations that
Porter sexually molested S.M.D. Id.
The prosecutor also stated the wimess said, "I don't need to study S.M.D. I don't
need to shrink her head and do an evaluation." Apparently, the witness never said this.
The court once again applied the rule that prosecutors cannot refer to evidence that
was not admitted in trial. Id. at 364.
89. Id. There is case law that suggests opposing parties must make a timely
objection and ask for a curative instruction to secure this claim for appeal. In State v.
Parker, 353 N.W.2d 122 (Minn. 1984), the court noted the defense's lack of objection
implied the argument was not prejudicial and therefore not improper. Id. at 128
(citing State v. Thomas, 305 Minn. 513, 517, 232 N.W.2d 766, 769 (1975)). Parker was
a case where the prosecutor made several statements regarding his opinion of the
[Vol. 22
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misquoted testimony from his witness and claimed that she had
received special recognition as an expert by both state and
federal judges, although no such recognition was ever shown.
The court held that in doing so, the prosecutor was improperly
attempting to enhance the witness' credibility.90
Porter's last claim was that the prosecutor improperly
focused on the defendant's right not to testify. A prosecutor
may not comment on a defendant's failure to call a witness or to
contradict testimony.91 Specifically, the prosecutor cannot say
his witness' testimony was "uncontradicted."92 In this case, the
prosecutor attempted to bolster his witness' credibility by stating
her testimony was "without impeachment by any cross-examina-
tion."9" The court held that this was too close to the idea of
uncontradicted testimony. Comments of this nature may suggest
to thejury that the defendant has a burden of proof that was not
met.94 They also erroneously suggest that the defendant did
not call a witness because he knew it would be unfavorable.95
Thus, both statements constituted misconduct.
The issue of what is proper or not in closing statements is
open to debate. The Porter case should be viewed as a clear
indication that justice cannot be won at any cost. Although
there remains no clear line as to what constitutes misconduct,
practitioners should view the ABA Standards, their underlying
rationales, and current case law to help guide their arguments.
Steven Terry
witness. For example, he stated, "I think they are telling the truth." Id. The court held,
although it disapproved, the statements did not reach the threshold of impropriety. Id.
90. Porter, 526 N.W.2d at 364.
91. Id. at 365.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 364.
94. Id. at 365. In State v. Gassier, 505 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. 1993), the court held
prosecutors may argue the defense did not live up to its opening statement promises.
Id. at 68-69. In Gass/er, the prosecutor said, "Defense counsel indicated that the
evidence would show that someone else committed the crime .... I submit [that there
has not] been any evidence submitted that anyone other than the defendant was
ultimately responsible.... ." Id. at 68. The defendant argued that this comment made
it seem like the defense had a burden of proof. The court disagreed by holding the
.prosecutor simply remarked that this (someone else was guilty) had not been
accomplished." Id. at 69.
95. Porter, 526 N.W.2d at 365.
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